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Abstract
This paper describes a new password-based mutual authentication protocol for Web systems
which prevents various kinds of phishing attacks. This protocol provides a protection of user’s
passwords against any phishers even if dictionary attack is employed, and prevents phishers from
imitating a false sense of successful authentication to users. The protocol is designed considering
interoperability with many recent Web applications which requires many features which current
HTTP authentication does not provide. The protocol is proposed as an Internet Draft submitted
to IETF, and implemented in both server side (as an Apache extension) and client side (as a
Mozilla-based browser and an IE-based one). The paper also proposes a new user-interface for
this protocol which is always distinguishable from fake dialogs provided by phishers.
1 Introduction
1.1 Summary of this paper
This paper describes a new password-based mutual authentication protocol for Web systems
which prevents various kinds of phishing attacks. Currently, initial design of the protocol is fin-
ished, an extension for Apache Web server and an Mozilla-based extended browser supporting the
new protocol are implemented, and the specification is submitted to IETF as an Internet Draft [12]
for standardization. This paper describes the criteria and decisions behind the protocol design, and
the difference from previous work, which are not discussed in the specification document.
Recently, phishing attacks are getting more and more sophisticated. Phishers not only steal
user’s password directly, but also imitate successful authentication to steal user’s private informa-
tion, check the password validity by forwarding the password to the legitimate server, or employ
a man-in-the-middle style attack to hijack user’s login session. Existing countermeasures such as
one-time passwords can not completely solve these problems.
The new protocol prevents such attacks by providing users a way to discriminate between true
and fake web servers using their own passwords. Even when a user inputs his/her password to a
fake website, using this authentication method, any information about the password does not leak
to the phisher, and the user certainly notices that the mutual authentication has failed. Phishers
cannot make such authentication attempt succeed, even if they forward received data from a user
to the legitimate server or vice versa. Users can safely enter private data to the web forms after
confirming that the mutual authentication has succeeded.
∗Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
(AIST).
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To achieve this goal, we use a mechanism in ISO/IEC 11770-4, a kind of PAKE (Password-
Authenticated Key Exchange) authentication algorithms as a basis. The use of a PAKE mecha-
nism allows users to use familiar ID/password based accesses, without fear of leaking any pass-
word information to the communication peer. The protocol, as a whole, is designed as a natural
extension to the current HTTP authentication schema such as Basic and Digest access authentica-
tion [7]. To use PAKE mechanism for such a purpose, we had to modify it to prevent credential
forwarding attacks (man-in-the-middle attacks). The protocol copes with HTTPS to provide en-
cryption, and it also supports the use of load balancers and SSL accelerators for easy deployment
on real systems.
There are some existing work (e.g. TLS-SRP extensions) which uses a kind of PAKE algo-
rithm in the transport layer. Those protocols can be used for closed applications like VPN or
IPP. However, we have considered that it is not suitable for general web systems which perform
authentication in the application layer.
This paper also proposes new user-interface for this authentication system. To prevent phish-
ing attacks, it is important to make users easily check whether the server authentication has been
succeeded or not. This information must not be forged by phishers, otherwise phishers delib-
erately circumvent users that the mutual authentication is established so that users input private
information to the phishing sites. We have implemented an extension for Mozilla Firefox which
uses the address-bar area for password input instead of using dialogs, and introduces an indica-
tor for displaying the result of authentication. When a user wants to input private information,
he/she just needs to check that this indicator has good (green) indication with the user’s ID. This
indication ensures that the document displayed in the content area is not from any phishing sites.
1.2 Phishing attacks
Throughout this paper, we define phishing as to make a false web service which runs on its own
host and imitates itself as an existing legitimate service running on another host, in order to steal
(or alter) some information which users intend to send to the legitimate service. This kind of
attack is easy to be done on the Internet: everyone including a rogue person can start running their
own web server, and make a visual imitation of any legitimate servers by simply copying their
visual elements such as logotypes. It is a inherent weakness of the Internet which comes from
the openness of it: we can not prevent such servers from running. This is also true for HTTPS
services in general (see also the discussion in Section 2.2.1).
The fundamental way of defense against phishing is to check the hostname displayed on the
address bar (or other identities such as the subjects of server certificates under HTTPS protocol)
service just before sending critical information to the server. However, phishers often use social
attack techniques so that users mistakenly send information to the phishing host without noticing
that the hostname is different from the genuine host. The purpose of the protocol is to provide a
secure alternative way to check host’s identity.
In the above definition, we ignored some transport-level attacks, such as DNS spoofing or
transport-level man-in-the-middle attacks, because the TLS (HTTPS) protocol works well against
such attacks.
1.3 The structure of this paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we will investigate current phishing
attacks and existing countermeasures for it. Section 3 describes the design goals and features of
the protocol. Section 4 contains a brief view of the protocol, and Section 5 shows our user interface
design which is an important part of our proposal. Section 6 describes our extension to HTTP
authentication protocol to make it friendly with existing web applications. Our implementation
and public experiments are briefly introduced in Section 7. Section 8 has discussions on the
proposal, and examine previous work in Section 9. Section 10 concludes this paper and shows
future direction of our research.
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Figure 1: Phishing attack patterns
2 Background
2.1 Categorization of phishing attacks
Phishing attacks are very common in recent days, and its method is getting tricky. Many users
including novice and even experienced users are still trapped with kind of attacks. Examining
existing phishing sites, we can find several patterns for how the phishing sites handled users’
passwords which are mistakenly inputted by users. Common patterns can be categorized as fol-
lows:
Pattern I (simple forgery without password): Do not use and acquire passwords at
all. Instead, acquire other private information such as credit card numbers.
Pattern II (simple password stealing): Ask users’ password and does nothing else.
Pattern III (blind authentication acceptance): Ask users’ passwords, always ac-
cept it and continue to forge users.
Pattern IV (credential forwarding): Ask users’ passwords, then use genuine sites
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to check their validity.
Pattern V (full transaction forwarding): Forward all communications (including
passwords) to genuine sites, possibly altering part of these (e.g., altering bank
account number for money transfers to steal money).
Figure 1 summarizes those patterns.
A pattern I attack is simple: first instance of phishing in the early days was to simply show
imitated web forms to let victim users input private information such as credit card numbers and
PINs, without any authentication attempts. These simple attack scheme are still in use, however,
as users are getting accustomed to phishing attacks, more sophisticated attacks appeared to forge
users.
A Pattern II attack, another instance in the early days was to steal user’s password. Af-
ter acquiring passwords from form inputs, phishers simply show either communication errors,
authentication errors, or just a “thanks” message. We categorize this as a “password-stealing
attack.”
Later, there was new pattern III attack, which was an extension of pattern I with fake pass-
word authentication added to it. Possible background of this phishing pattern might be that phish-
ing was getting popular and people start to feel unnatural for the pattern II phishing sites. When
users entered the password and get no meaningful response, they begin feeling something unusual
and change their password immediately. New kinds of phishing sites first show a fake authenti-
cation requests, and when a user enters a password, they show another form to input private
information like pattern I attacks regardless of the inputted passwords. Because victim users have
been inputted passwords, they believe in that they are communicating with genuine sites. We call
these “blind authentication acceptance attacks”.
When the blind acceptance attacks became common, users began to take a countermeasure
to them. To detect such attacks, users first input wrong passwords to every site they are visiting
and see the responses from the server. As phishing sites do not know the true passwords, their
response to wrong passwords will be “login succeeded”. However, this countermeasure was not
perfect: some phishing sites started sending the inputted passwords to the genuine sites to see
whether they are correct ones. These attacks are hereafter named “credential forwarding attacks”,
or “pattern IV attacks”.
Another sophisticated phishing sites ever seen are to forward almost all web traffic to the
genuine sites and to steal or hijack the web session of the user [9]. When a user sent a critical
information such as a bank account number for money transfer, they alter it to make false re-
quest (e.g. redirect bank money transfer to their own accounts). We name it a “full-transaction
forwarding (pattern V) attack”. This attack works even when there are additional (two-factor)
authentication present.
Note that the last pattern is completely different from transport-level man-in-the-middle at-
tacks. In transport-level man-in-the-middle attacks, the client software is forged to communicate
with false servers. In phishing cases, however, the client user is forged, and the client software
is directed by user to communicate with phishing hosts. This makes some cryptographic solution
for man-in-the-middle attacks (such as TLS) ineffective against phishing attacks.
2.2 Existing countermeasures against phishing
There are many proposed countermeasures against phishing attacks. However, none of them are
satisfactory and complete. Table 1 summarizes the comparison in this section. It shows, for each
countermeasures, whether the measure is effective for various patterns of phishing attacks shown
in the previous section.
2.2.1 Global whitelists and blacklists
Most common approaches against phishing attacks are to maintain a list of either good or bad sites
by trusted third-party. The common problem of those approaches are that such methods cannot be
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Table 1: Comparison of Phising countermeasures
Prevents Phishing Patterns Applicable Detecting Portable
I II III IV V for all all (no local
no pwd. pwd. steal accept pwd. fwd. session fwd. genuine sites†1 phishing sites†2 storage)†3
Global whitelist yes yes yes yes yes NO – yes
Global blacklist yes yes yes yes yes – NO yes
Local whitelist yes yes yes yes yes NO – NO
SSL with client key NO yes NO yes yes yes? NO NO
Digest authentication ? Weak†3 NO NO NO yes NO yes
PwdHash ? Weak†3 NO yes yes yes NO yes
Our proposal yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
†1 Every sites, including both large-scale and small-scale (e.g. personal) sites, have opportunity to use the protocol
without any social requirements (e.g. third-party screening or auditing).
†2 this means that whether phishing sites fails to imitate the behavior associated to genuine sites under each countermea-
sure (e.g. successful authentication). social requirements (e.g. third-party screening or auditing).
†3 Whether users are free from managing information (such as private keys) stored in client software.
†4
“Weak” means cryptographically weak against off-line dictionary attacks.
complete by the Internet’s nature. Especially for whitelist approaches, there is always a tradeoff
between rejection of legitimate servers (false positive) and false acceptance of phishing servers
(false negative), and it seems to be impossible to give an appropriate rights for every “good” or
“genuine” website on the Internet while keeping all phishing sites away.
In former days, SSL server certificates are thought to be providing some kind of trusts over
commerce web sites, as a kind of whitelist. Valid SSL certificates are only issued by designated
certificate authorities (CAs) which are trusted by Web browser vendors. However, the validation
for issuing SSL certificates is too easy for phishers in fact. Moreover, many CAs recently started
to issue so-called “class-1 SSL server certificates” or “domain-validated certificates” which can
be obtained without any evidence of real-world identities. In the reality, there are phishing sites
which runs HTTPS sites with valid SSL server certificates. Although SSL server certificates still
provide an important role for transport security1, it is now almost useless for protecting casual
(careless) users against phishing.2
To overcome the problem of SSL server certificates and phishing attacks, CAs and browser
venders introduced a special kind of SSL server certificates called “EV (extended-validation)-SSL
certificates” [2]. CAs has introduced much stricter criteria for issuing EV SSL certificates, which
can almost never be satisfied by phishers. When web browsers connect to HTTPS servers with
EV-SSL certificates installed, the address bar regions are illuminated green to indicate that the site
is most likely to be a genuine one. However, as a consequence of the stricter validation criteria,
it can not be introduced for every genuine web sites. Their intention seems to prevent phishing
against some of very high-profile services such as banking, and not to prevent all phishing attacks.
The opposite to those whitelist approaches are to create and continuously maintain a up-to-
date list of known phishing websites so that users will not visit those websites. Most of the
today’s web browsers, such as Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox has built-in supports for such
“anti-phishing” functionalities. However, such blacklist can never be complete. For an instance,
according to the documents which is issued by Microsoft and Mozilla [10, 3], at least 10% of
known phishing sites can not be prevented by those filters.
1With server certificates issued by trusted CAs, TLS ensures that the client software is communicating to some server
who are allowed to use the hostname the software intend to communicate. However, as long as there is a valid server
certificate presented, even if the software-recognized hostname is not the user’s intention, TLS will simply accept it.
2If users were careful and paranoid enough so that they check certificates for every accesses, they can simply protect
themselves from phishing by checking the domain part of the URL to be accessed.
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2.2.2 Local whitelists
Another kind of approaches is to maintain a user-specific whitelist of known genuine hosts by
each users.
Petname tool [4] is a Mozilla Firefox extension for providing local whitelist functionality. It
allows users to “name” each website they visit. When the users visit the same site for the second
time, it shows the user-given name with a green background, showing that the site seems to be the
intended one.
Alternatively, most browsers have a built-in support for password managers, which can be
used for this purpose. When users let browsers to remember a password for a genuine site, the
browsers will automatically input the password only when the user visits the same site. The
browsers will not input the password for the phishing sites with a different URI from the genuine
sites, thus users can notice when they visit phishing sites.
Another related approach is to customize login screen for each user by using HTTP cookies
stored in the browser. An identifier cookie is stored into each browser, and when a user accesses a
login page, the server customizes the part of the screen using the identifier sent as a cookie. As an
access to phishing sites does not contain that identifier cookie, it can only send an uncustomized
login screen to the users.
The common problem of those approaches are that these requires local storages, which hard-
ens users for using several computers alternately. In addition, users have to maintain the list
appropriately and carefully.
2.2.3 Existing cryptographic solutions
There are some cryptographic approaches for hardening web authentication. SSL client authen-
tication introduces public-key cryptography for authenticating clients to servers. Users installs a
client certificate and the corresponding secret key to browsers, and when the server requests the
browser authenticates themselves using the secret key, in the way it is cryptographically secure
against secret stealing and credential forwarding attacks (Patterns II and IV). The server will be
authenticated by using server certificates as usual. Sometimes it is called a mutual authentication
for SSL. However, in the context of Web browsers, these two authentication attempts are not tied
together: the server only needs to show any valid SSL server certificate to be authenticated by the
client, and the client will not know whether the client certificate has been verified by the server or
not. As a result, the client authentication can not prevent blind acceptance (pattern III) phishing
attacks which is previously mentioned.
Digest web authentication algorithm [7] uses MD5 hash function and a challenge-response
style protocol to let clients authenticated by the servers without sending a plain-text password,
intending to prevent password stealing attacks (Pattern II). However, when the client sends the
MD5-hashed response to a phishing website, the phisher can send that value to the genuine site to
make a successful authentication, thus it is vulnerable for credential-forwarding attacks (pattern
IV). It is also vulnerable for blind acceptance attacks (pattern III).3 Furthermore, as long as users
use passwords with a memorable entropy, recent computers can easily reverse the hash function
by a simple off-line brute-force dictionary attacks to regain the plain-text password. According to
a NIST publication [11, Appendix A], user-inputted passwords of 40 characters only have about
62 bits of entropy, which is considered insecure against off-line attacks nowadays. It means that
the Digest authentication can not actually prevent plain-text password to be obtained by phishers
and eavesdroppers.
PwdHash [13] overcome the credential-forwarding attacks by generating a distinct hashed
temporary password for each websites from a single passphrase. When user input a passphrase
preceded by two @ characters to any password entry form field, PwdHash traps the keystrokes and
inserts a temporary password generated by hashing the input passphrase with the hostname of the
3Digest authentication mechanism defines a protocol by which the server authenticate itself to the client. However, it is
a optional feature chosen by the server’s own, which makes it useless.
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form’s target. When user unwittingly inputted a passphrase to a phishing site (with @@-prefix),
the generated temporary password will be different from the one valid for the genuine site, thus
preventing password stealing (pattern II) and forwarding (patterns IV & V) attacks.
However, PwdHash can not provide mutual authentication, thus it can not prevent blindly-
accepting (Pattern III) attacks. In addition, the off-line attack can regain the user’s password in
the same way as for the Digest authentication, which makes it ineffective against attacks in pattern
II.
3 Our proposal
3.1 Design goals and criteria
Considering the weakness of existing countermeasures against phishing, we designed a new au-
thentication protocol which can easily prevent all kinds of phishing attacks. The design of the
protocol considers future replacement of HTML form-based authentication mechanisms imple-
mented in Web-application layer as well as Basic and Digest authentication mechanisms defined
in [7]. To realize this goal, the design must be carefully considered so that it does not make
existing web applications difficult to adopt the new protocol.
While designing the protocol, we have settled several goals and criteria for it.
Password-based authentication without local storage Novice users are well accustomed to the
password-based authentication, and it is difficult for them to manage local secrets (such as
private keys) stored in the local hard-disk in the correct way. In addition, the existence of lo-
cal secret also makes difficult for users to use more than one computer simultaneously. The
protocol avoid requirements for any long-term local secret storages and/or local whitelists.
Secure mutual authentication Of course, the protocol must be secure enough to prevent phish-
ing attacks. Especially, we focus on that it provides mutual authentication to prevent blind
acceptance attacks (Pattern III), which was not achieved in the above-presented existing
countermeasures. Of course, it should be secure against other types of attacks including
forwarding attacks (Patterns IV and V).
The design also considers that the protocol should secure against off-line attacks even after
the client has been started communication with phishing websites, because normal users is
unlikely to be able to set up a password which is resistant to off-line dictionary attack.
There is an Internet-draft proposing introduction of Mutual authentication for preventing
phishing attacks as mentioned in [8], but none of proposed/widely-accepted countermea-
sures provide this feature for HTTP.
Generic (equal opportunity) The protocol should be usable to any web services who want to
provide user authentication, including personal websites. Current EV-SSL scheme does
not provide this criteria: EV-SSL certificates can only be acquired by parties having long-
enough credit as a commercial entity.
Compatibility with real Web applications and systems The protocol should be designed so
that it can be easily deployed for many real Web application with complex needs and heavy
loads. Many existing solutions, including Digest authentication fails in this criteria.
In more detail, we focused on the following topics.
Per-URL authentication configuration, Multiple authentication realms on one server
In real web systems, authentication is defined for sets of web resources specified
by URIs. For example, most Web applications have both public contents (e.g. blog
contents) and private, authenticated contents (e.g. blog editing interfaces). The
protocol should be able to set up authentication only for the part of the resources on
one Web server, unlike TLS client authentication.
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In addition to the above, there are web applications which have multiple set of authen-
tication “realms” (groups of resources which share same setting of the authentication)
on one server.
For example, the mail interface of the “Google Apps”4 sets up an independent au-
thentication realm for each domains hosted: The main Gmail service has the URI
http://mail.google.com/, while the hosted service for example.com domain has
the URI http://mail.google.com/a/example.com/. Other examples are the cus-
tomization interface for hosted mailing lists, a hosted environment for wikis, etc. When
multiple realms are not supported, such services must set up individual host names for
every realms, which is so cumbersome that unlikely to be deployed.
Sufficient support for recent Web application designs One strong motivation for current
web application designers/implementors to use form-based authentication instead of
HTTP Basic authentication is the flexibility of authorization. When authentication is
implemented using forms and HTTP cookies, the Web application can control various
aspect of authentication/authorization. For example, such applications can provide
both unauthenticated (guest) contents and user-customized contents on the same URI
depending on the status of authentication, set timeout for user’s inactivity or total login
time and force logout, and implement explicit “logout” UI to forget authentication
status so that the same terminal can be used for multiple user identities (including
unauthenticated guests).
However, form-based authentication is inherently vulnerable for phishing attacks, be-
cause the behavior of the forms is fully controlled by the web contents. To the purpose
of the security, we have to avoid use of form authentication as well as existing HTTP
authentication. To replace form-based authentication with our new protocol, the pro-
tocol provides several functionalities for implementing such applications on the top of
this protocol.
Compatibility with load-reducing equipments Many web services with heavy loads uses
several existing equipments for reducing the server loads. For example, many services
uses SSL accelerators, which are reverse-proxies dedicated for talking TLS protocol
and forward traffics to the back-end servers. They also uses a load-balancing reverse-
proxies with multiple back-end servers for the same contents.
We designed the protocol so that most of the these facilities can be used with our au-
thentication protocol as much as possible. Some example configuration for deploying
our protocol in large systems are shown in Section 8.2.
3.2 Designing Policies
Given the above criteria, we have designed the protocol having the following properties.
3.2.1 Use of password authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
To prevent password to be revealed to the phishing sites even with off-line attacks, we have chosen
a variant of PAKE (Password-based Authentication and Key Exchange) protocols as an underlying
cryptographic protocol. PAKE protocols enable mutual authentication between clients and servers
by using only a shared “weak secret” (such as passwords), while keeping weak secrets not known
to the both party on the failed authentication. By this property, when users have been connected to
the wrong server (possibly a phishing server), and when they try to authenticate themselves using
this protocol, the users’ passwords are kept secret to the server, unlike Basic/form authentication
(passwords are sent in plaintext) or Digest authentication (vulnerable against simple blute-force
attacks) mechanisms. This prevents password stealing attacks (Pattern II) completely. Further-
more, the protocol benefits from PAKE to detect blind acceptance attacks (Pattern III). Mutual
4http://www.google.com/a/
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authentication provided by PAKE protocols will never succeed when the server does not know
about user’s password. The protocol, unlike previous ones, checks successful authentication on
both client and server side to detect and prevent such attacks.
3.2.2 Detection of credential forwarding attacks
PAKE is actually a key-exchange protocol which is usually used for both authentication and en-
cryption. Under such use case a man-in-the-middle attack (MITM) is impossible, because the
encryption key established by the key exchange is known only to the both peers of the PAKE ne-
gotiation. However, because the protocol implements authentication in the HTTP communication
layer, we use established secret shared key only for the authentication. In this setting, PAKE itself
can not provide security against MITM, thus we need another mechanism to prevent credential
forwarding attacks.
Our solution is to modify PAKE protocol to check that intended host-name is matched at both
authenticating endpoints. This check is sufficient for preventing phishing, because forwarding
phishing sites uses hostnames which is different from the genuine servers. When a client talks to
a phishing websites which forwards the received messages to another website, the authentication
will fail because the weak secret and/or confirmation materials does not match, preventing pattern
IV (and V) attacks. The secret password will not be revealed to the phishing servers also in this
case, by the virtue of the behavior of PAKE protocol in secret mismatch case.
3.2.3 Extending HTTP-layer authentication architecture
To achieve authentication handling depending on the requests, we have designed the whole proto-
col as an extension to the current HTTP protocol [5] and HTTP authentication mechanisms [7] in
the HTTP message layer. The protocol is naturally designed using existing architectures of HTTP
authentication as far as possible, so that it can be easily integrated to existing HTTP implementa-
tions.
One problem of authentication tied to the connection layer, such as TLS client authentication,
is that the authentication runs before the client send the request to the server, therefore server
can not know what resource the client is accessing to. There is also a gap between connection
layer authentication and the HTTP keep-alive architecture. The proposed protocol avoids such
deficiencies.
On the other hand, there is several weaknesses on applicability of both HTTP-based and
connection-based authentication for web applications as described above. We are solving those
weaknesses by slightly extending the HTTP authentication architecture (see Section 6).
4 The protocol
This section describes the overview of the proposed protocol in this section. The authentication is
based on a PAKE variant called the “Key Agreement Method 3 (KAM3)”, originally proposed by
Kwon, defined in the ISO standard ISO-10770-4:2006 [6]. In this section, only a typical conver-
sation for the protocol using discrete-logarithm-based settings is described: the full specification
is available as an IETF Internet Draft [12].
An example session trace for the whole process of the protocol negotiation will be shown in
Appendix A.
Notations
In this section, we let q be a prime number defining a finite group, g be a generator inside the
“ mod q” group, and r be a rank of the subgroup generated by g. The generator g must be carefully
chosen so that r becomes a large-enough prime (in the specification we set the parameters to
satisfy r = (q− 1)/2). H(x˜) is a hash value generated from elements of list x˜.
9
4.1 Preprocessing (registration phase)
Before authentication starts, there are some things to be set up. The authentication is performed
using a username and a secret password. A pair of a username and a password is valid for one
“authentication realm”, a group of Web pages on which the same set of users and passwords are
valid.
In the protocol, each authentication realm is defined as follows: a parameter “auth-domain”
specifies the range of the hosts using the same set of usernames and passwords (authentication
domain). It can be a single host (FQDN, e.g. “www.example.com”), or it can be limited a
specific protocol and port of the host (e.g. “https://www.example.com:443”). It also supports
a realm which is a set of hosts in the same domain (e.g., “*.example.com”) to support single-
sign-on services. Another parameter “realm” is a simple string which is used as a label inside
each authentication domain. Each pair of auth-domain and the realm defines one authentication
realm.
For each authentication realm, a set of valid username-password pairs is defined. The user has
one pair of the username and the password in plaintext. The weak secret pi used by the client for
PAKE-based authentication is extended from the ISO specification to include the authentication
domain, the realm and the user-name, defined as
pi = H(algorithm,auth-domain, realm,username,password).
The server will only need its specially encrypted version J(pi) defined as
J(pi) = gpi mod q.
The retrieval of the password from J(pi) needs brute-force searching.
4.2 Message Exchanges
For the first access to the authenticated contents, the protocol requires three round-trips of HTTP
messages. First, as a response to a client’s request (without any authentication credentials), the
server sends a usual HTTP 401 response to request authentication. This is very similar to the
Basic and Digest HTTP authentication. The response from the server specifies an “algorithm”
which defines the parameters (g, p,r), an authentication realm and a realm to be used.
The client asks the user for the username and password. When the password is available from
a user input, the client constructs a cryptographic value wa, which is generated from a random
number sa as
wa = gsa mod q,
and sends the second HTTP request along with the user-name.
The intermediate 401 response from the server contains another cryptographic value wb, which
is generated from J(pi) stored in the server-side password database and another random number
(sb) as
wb = (J(pi)×w
H(1,wa)
a )
sb mod q.
Because this value have randomness from sb which is larger than the entropy of J(pi), wb can not
be distinguished from a random number by any other party. This means that the value of J(pi)
can not be extracted from wb in any way unless one knows pi . The equations for wa and wb, are
directly derived from the ISO specification.
At this time, both the client and the server compute a shared secret z using different set of
known values. The client calculates it from sa, wa, wb and pi as
z = w
(sa+H(2,wa,wb))/(sa∗H(1,wa)+pi) mod r
b mod q,
and the server calculates it from wa, sb, wb as
z = (wa × gH(2,wa,wb))sb mod q.
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If and only if a correct pair of pi and J(pi) is used, the two z calculated at both sides will match.
As long as eavesdroppers do not know either sa or sb, z can not be reconstructed because this key
exchange is a modification of Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.
The final step of the protocol is to check whether mutual authentication is succeeded by con-
firming the value of z at each side. the client sends a third request containing value of oa. The
value oa is a hash value defined as
oa = H(4,wa,wb,z,nc,v),
where v is the host verification element defined in Section 4.3, and nc is the value of nonce
counter. The server calculates the same value by its own value of z and verifies the equality. If
they matches, the server grants the access to the resource and sends the final response with the
value ob, which is generated in the similar way as
ob = H(3,wa,wb,z,nc,v).
The receiving client must verify the value ob to check whether the server is genuine. Without
knowing the true value of J(pi), the server can not construct the correct value of ob. This means
that phishers can not forge clients by blindly accepting authentication requests, thus Pattern III
attacks are prevented. The equations for oa and ob are also extended from the ISO specification
to include various additional values to be verified, such as nc and v.
When a second request to the same host is sent, the client can reuse the shared secret z by
directly sending the third message to the server using the same session identifier and z, increment-
ing the nonce counter. In this case, both clients and servers only need to perform a lightweight
hash operation but no public-key operations.
4.3 Host verification element
Host verification element v ensures that the client is directly communicating to the server on which
the genuine web service intended to do so5, and no credential forwarding attacks are employed.
The value to be used for such verification must have the following properties: (1) it is shared
between the client and the server, and (2) when talked to the phishing site, it will be different from
what will be used for the genuine site. This protocol uses the following values, chosen by the
“validation” field in the response header, for that purpose.
• “Host” verification: the string v will specify the scheme-host-port triple, for example,
“http://www.example.com:80”.
• “Tls-cert” verification: v will be the hash of the server public-key certificate which the
HTTPS server uses.
• “Tls-key” verification: v will be the master secret of the underlying TLS sessions.
For HTTP services the Host verification is used, as in this case transport-level security is not
intended. For HTTPS services, we can use any of the above three methods safely, although we
recommend tls-cert mainly for applicability. See Section 8.1 for some discussions.
5 User Interface
A possible attack to this protocol is to forge the user interface asking a password. Existing Basic
and Digest authentication usually uses a modal dialog box for asking usernames and passwords.
However, it can be easily imitated by using either a stylized HTML, an HTML pop-up window
or even a picture of a pop-up dialog box. In general, any region inside the content area is always
5the protocol allows services to safely introduce a relaying facility on their intention, while preventing unwanted relaying
attacks. See Section 8.2 for some examples.
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(a) Mutual authentication is requested.
Input fields are in the chrome area beside the address bar field.
(b) Mutual authentication has been succeeded.
Username “mutualtest” is displayed in the chrome area.
Figure 2: Chrome-area input fields for user-names and passwords
vulnerable for forging by phishers. In this context, the weakness of the forms inside the document
is needless to say. If plaintext passwords are sent to the phishers outside of this proposed protocol,
we can not prevent any patterns of phishing attacks.
To prevent such kind of attacks, we propose to use the “chrome area” (the area where an
address bar and other browser UI components are exist) for the new authentication protocol.6 Our
implementation of the Mozilla Firefox extension uses address-bar area (where web-pages do not
have any access to) for password input instead of using pop-up dialog windows. Note that the
chrome area is considered to be a secure region, and if there were a method to overwrite there, it
shall be considered to be a vulnerability of the browsers [1]7. Inside the address bar we put input
boxes for a username and a password, and also an indicator for displaying the authentication
status.
In our implementation, the input boxes are initially not displayed. When users visit a website
which requires mutual authentication, two input boxes for a username and a password automati-
cally appear on the right of the address bar (Figure 2 (a)). When the user enters the user-name and
the password the authentication begins, and after the authentication success has been recognized
by the client (by checking the final ob value in the response message), it displays a mutually-
authenticated user-name with a green background on the right of the address bar (Figure 2 (b)),
showing that the identity of the host is verified by the password.
By using this protocol and the UI, users can prevent all patterns of phishing attacks which
involve passwords (see patterns II–V in Section 2.1) by following two simple rules:
• Users must enter password only to the text-box provided by this UI.
6It is extremely important that the proposed UI is only used for this protocol (and more secure protocols, if any) and not
for weaker authentication mechanisms such as Basic and Digest authentications, so that to it is ensured that the password
entered to this UI is not sent in an insecure way.
7In the past, there was such implementation problems to allow forgery of browser security indications, but now all known
problems are considered as security vulnerabilities and fixed.
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• Users must enter private information such as credit-card numbers only when the indicator
becomes green.
If a user sees the green indicator, user can trust that the communicating service is the genuine one
(whom the user has told his/her password before).8
Furthermore, if this protocol is widely accepted and introduced to many commercial websites,
we can expect that the above rules prevents even phishing attacks without passwords involved
(Pattern I attacks), because when users are well trained to always use Mutual authentication, they
will find that such phishing sites are requiring an unsafe authentication which is not the usual.
The only exception to the above rules is the initial enrollment to the web services. In the
current design, users must input a plaintext password to somewhere in which it is sent in raw
password (possibly) over the TLS secured channel. Future version of the protocol may support
sending encrypted password token J(pi) to the server, but it does not completely solve the prob-
lems in such situation. In the time of initial enrollment, users must always be very careful to
determine whether they should continue to access the web services, because they need not only
to check the connection integrity, but also to check the service’s social trustworthiness which is
completely outside of the scope of authentication protocols.
6 Additional features for Web applications
We have designed the protocol as it is almost upper-compatible with existing HTTP authentication
mechanism. If websites are using Basic or Digest authentication, it is easy to migrate to the new
protocol by reconstructing the password database from plaintext passwords.9
However, most existing websites are using form-based password authentication implemented
in web application level instead of HTTP-layer authentication. There may be many reasons to do
so including UI design flexibility, but we think that the strongest reason is the lack of flexibility
in HTTP Basic and Digest authentication. We have extended a base mechanism of HTTP authen-
tication in several ways to overcome these problems with the mutual authentication protocol.
6.1 Optional authentication
Today’s typical web services often accept guest users and authenticated users simultaneously.
Such a service shows a default contents for the guests when a user accesses it for the first time,
and when the user authenticates themselves it shows a content customized for each user. For ex-
ample, in a commercial auction website, summaries of exhibited items are displayed for all users
including unauthenticated guests, but a form asking a bid price is displayed only for authenticated
users. It is easy to implement this kind of services by using form-based authentication, but it is
tricky to implement with HTTP Basic/Digest authentication.
The specification of the new protocol introduces a direct support for such services. Web
servers can ask clients to optionally start mutual authentication while sending contents for guest
users by using a newly-introduced “Optional-WWW-Authenticate” header.
In websites using optional authentications, Web servers will send normal “200 OK” responses
with a newly-defined “Optional-WWW-Authenticate” header. The browser will render the
response body (containing a page for guest users) in a usual way, and at the same time it enables
the input fields for authentications. If users wish to visit the website as a guest user, they can just
continue browsing as usual. On the contrary, if they want to use website as authenticated users,
the browser will simply send a Mutual authentication request by the users’ requests, and servers
8Of course, it does not mean that the peer will use the credit-card numbers righteously. If users use “untrustful” services
as their intention, it is up to their responsibility. Our protocol’s responsibility is to prevent communicating with untrustful
services without the users’ intention.
9For Digest authentication, the protocol even provides a backward compatibility feature so that the database can be
directly converted for the new mutual-authentication protocol.
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will respond as usual. Our new UI design for this authentication protocol (Section 5) is well suited
for this use, because it is implemented as non-modal input fields.
Implementation for this additional feature will not be difficult: In the server side, semantics
for a “200 OK” response with an Optional-WWW-Authenticate is almost similar to a “401
Authentication Required” response with a Optional-WWW-Authenticate header. Also in the
client side, the effort for implementing optional authentication will be almost as same as that for
implementing the Mutual Authentication itself. Our implementations already support this in both
sides.
6.2 Application-level control for login/logout behavior
Many web applications have their own policies for handling the authentications. For example,
many applications implements a forced time-out for login sessions for either user’s inactivity time
or the time from the beginning. In some cases applications want to forcibly terminate an user’s
authentication sessions. Some application forces entry-point of the authenticated pages to on
location.
However, such control was one of the weak points of existing HTTP authentication mech-
anisms. In current HTTP authentication mechanism, once a user inputs the user-name and the
password to a browser, it continues to send them to the website until the user closes all browser
windows, and there was no way for servers to specify that the current log-in session is to be ter-
minated, except for requesting a new credential by sending a false “login failed” response. In
addition, users are also difficult to switch to another account without closing the browser once.
The proposed protocol introduces a new header for a finer control of the browser’s behavior
related to an authentication. Using the new header, named Authentication Control, servers
can specify that the client should forget login passwords after a given time period. It also allows
servers to specify a conditional redirects to another URL based on a current status of authen-
tications, e.g. a redirect only for a user not starting an authentication. By using this header,
applications can use many of current designs of webpage structures (such as fixed log-in page or
log-out page) as is, along with our new authentication mechanism with little modifications. Our
UI implementation also allows users to logout the service by their own.
6.3 Domain-level single sign-on (SSO) support
Recent large-scale websites such as Yahoo! or Google use several hosts for serving a group of
services. In the HTTP Basic authentication, however, the realm of the authentication (the area
that shares the same user-name and the password) is defined by the pair of the host-name and
the realm value specified in the response header, which means that the same password must be
reentered for every host even in the same domain.
The current version of the protocol supports this kind of websites by allowing a wild-card for
the authentication domain. If the authentication domain is set to “*.example.com”, for example,
the same user-name and password will be automatically used for any host inside the domain
example.com when the same realm value is used. While passwords are shared, each servers
inside the authentication domain will need an access to valid password databases, because the
host verification element v still differs between servers. This forbids credential forwarding even
within the same authentication domain. As a result, phishing will be impossible even when there
is a less-trusted host inside the domain as long as the password database is kept secret.
7 Implementation
We already have several implementations of the protocol, most of which are published as open-
source software. These software can be downloaded from our project homepage10.
10Project Homepage URL: https://www.rcis.aist.go.jp/special/MutualAuth/
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For the server side, we implemented an extension module for the Apache 2.2 Web server. The
module, mod auth mutual, supports basic functionality of the Mutual authentication protocol. It
can be used almost in the same way as existing authentication modules such as mod_auth_basic
and mod_auth_digest. We have also implemented a preliminary module for the WEBRick
server written in the Ruby language.
For client side, We have two implementations: our MutualTestFox (shown in Figure 2), which
is a modified version of open-source Mozilla Firefox, implements both back-end protocol and pro-
posed UI design. We also have an Internet Explorer-based implementation based on Lunascape11,
a proprietary browser implementation.
There are two experiment Web sites which are open to public. Especially, Yahoo! Japan
Auction have deployed in the last year a special experimental trial site on which users can log onto
the trial site using their existing Yahoo! ID and passwords, using both client implementations.
7.1 Performance
We designed the protocol carefully so that the computation resources required for server side
will be as low as possible. If an authentication session takes its first place, there will be three
HTTP round-trips (request-response pairs). There is one round-trips more than the Basic or Di-
gest authentication methods, but unlike Digest method, there is no need to generate any random
numbers until the client really need to authenticate itself to the server.12 There will be two com-
putations similar to RSA secret-key operation (a power-modulus with large exponents), and two
cryptographic-hash computations. This overhead is similar to the SSL client authentications.
Once an authentication has succeeded, a “cryptographic session” associated with a crypto-
graphic secret is shared between a server and a client. For the second (or later) request, authen-
tication can be done in a very light-method way with only one hash operation (no public-key
cryptography operations). These sessions are designed to be implemented in a constant mem-
ory (including nonce duplication checks), and can be discarded in any time under the server’s
decisions.
On the real web server we’re currently using (a server with 1.73GHz Intel Pentium M proces-
sor and 512MB memory), an authentication request without pre-shared secrets takes only about
132 milliseconds for processing (using 2048-bit discrete-logarithm and SHA-256 setting)13. After
a secret has been shared between peers, processing the second request only requires 0.4 millisec-
onds.
8 Discussions
8.1 Choice of host verification elements
As described in Section 4.3, we provide three possible values used for host verifications. Strictly
speaking, the strength of the verification is tls-key the strongest, tls-cert the next, and host
the weakest. Tls-cert verification assumes the secrecy of the secret key associated with the cer-
tificate, and host verification assumes correct operation of the CA and PKI even for applications
outside the Web.
The reason for us to provide the solutions other than tls-key is the difficulty of the im-
plementation of the tls-key verification. If every details of the TLS protocol implementation
is available, it is possible to implement the strongest tls-key method. However, for the most
black-box implementation of TLS protocols, it is not possible to acquire the shared secret key of
11http://www.lunascape.jp/
12HTTP Digest authentication needs random nonces for every responses from servers, even if the client do not want to
start authentication.
13We measured a time consumed in our authentication handlers inside Apache web server, without network and other
overheads.
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Figure 3: Possible deployment for Mutual authentication
the underlying connections. Tls-cert, on the other hand, works quite well with black-box TLS
implementations because it only uses a public information. It also works well with environments
using TLS accelerators, important for large-scale installations, without sacrificing security.
8.2 Possible deployments
The protocol design enables several flexible ways of deployment for existing web system with
minimal modifications.
1. Single-server setting
For the small services, the server-side authenticator can simply be installed in the web server
(Figure 3-A). We have implemented an extension module for the Apache web server, which
can be used almost in the same way as other authentication modules such as mod auth basic.
The simpler one of our experiment websites uses this setting.
2. Authenticating reverse-proxy
If there are web servers which are difficult to modify its setting, we can implement authen-
tication in reverse proxies (Figure 3-B). The reverse-proxy selectively adds mutual authen-
tication requests into the responses from the back-end server, and when authentication has
been succeed, the proxy passes the authentication results to the back-end server using ad-
ditional headers. This reverse proxy can also work as a load-balancer for several back-end
servers.
Our large-scale experiment on the Yahoo! Auction trial site uses this scheme, since the
existing service servers are not possible to implement Mutual authentication directly.
3. TLS accelerators
Many existing web services uses dedicated, single-function SSL accelerators to reduce SSL
encryption overhead on the application servers. The proposed protocol can cope with such
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systems (Figure 3-C). When TLS accelerators are used, TLS encryption negotiations are
done between clients and the accelerator, and the requests sent encrypted from the client
are forwarded to the back-end web server in plain-text form. In this case, it is impossible
to perform user authentication in the TLS-level, because such accelerators does not have
anything but simple TLS negotiation functions. However, our protocol works under such
deployment, as long as the back-end server knows that the accelerators are used and the
tls-cert host verification is used. The back-end server speaks plaintext HTTP protocol
and negotiates the Mutual authentication as if it is using the HTTPS protocol. As long as the
accelerators forward only responses from the genuine servers, phishing attacks are correctly
prevented.
9 Related work
Several related works are presented in Section 2.2. In this section we describe about TLS-SRP,
recently proposed extension to TLS.
TLS-SRP [14] is an extension to the TLS encryption protocol which uses SRP, another variant
of PAKE protocols, both for authentication and key exchange. TLS-SRP can be used either with
or without a server certificate issued by PKI certificate providers, and performs SRP key exchange
during the negotiation phase. It may be suited with several TLS applications which basically use
one connection per client, such as IMAPS, POPS, and TLS-based VPNs, because all of these pro-
tocols perform authentication and application-specific operations sequentially on one TCP/TLS
connection, so that TLS-SRP can naturally replace the first authentication phase.
While we designed the proposed protocol, we have examined the use of TLS-SRP for pre-
venting phishing against Web application systems along with the current HTTPS protocol, and
we have concluded that it is not well suited for Web uses for several reasons. While TLS-SRP’s
authentication is strongly bound to the underlying TCP connection, HTTP transport is not used
in such way: in HTTP, concurrent HTTP requests to several applications in the same web server
are sent sharing one or several TCP or TLS connections intermixed. Furthermore, the keep-alive
feature implemented in HTTP/1.1 allows several requests to hosts sharing the same IP address to
be streamlined in one underlying connection, either TCP or TLS. When TLS-SRP is used for Web
application authentication, two requests for different web applications with separate authentica-
tion and authorization may be sent on the same TLS-SRP connection authenticated with a single
identity, which is conceptually undesirable.
Moreover, because TLS-SRP negotiation is performed before establishment of TLS encrypted
channel (i.e. before the detail of requests are sent), there is no way to negotiate any detail of the
authentication (such as realms) before investigating the request. It forces all contents on one
server to share one authentication realm, which sometimes requires large-scale redesign of the
application. For those reasons, we abandoned to use TLS-SRP and have implemented PAKE-
based authentication inside the HTTP protocol.
10 Conclusion and future directions
We have designed a new secure password-based Web mutual authentication protocol which pre-
vents various kinds of phishing attacks. The protocol design considers various aspects of existing
web systems, such as additional requirements from applications, systems with multiple hosts, and
various ways of system deployments. We also propose new browser UI design to securely use this
protocol.
Our implementation of the browser extension and the web server module are available as
open-source software. We are also performing demonstration and experiments in a part of the
‘Yahoo! Auction” website, which is the largest auction website in Japan. During the experiment
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we will examine applicability of this protocol to the existing Web applications, examine the user
experiences, and use these results to improve the protocol specification for standardization.
We currently consider to extend the protocol to support various existing authentication ap-
plications. For example, supporting secure one-time password tokens and inter-domain single
sign-on protocols may be desirable. We hope this protocol to be widely-accepted and deployed in
many websites to defeat phishing attacks.
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A An example session log
This appendix shows an example log for a session performing a Mutual authentication. Large
cryptographic values and other undetermined values unrelated to the protocol is replaced to place-
holders like ....
Like existing HTTP authentication, the client first send a request without any authorization
credentials, and server requests an authentication in a 401 response.
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
HTTP/1.1 401 Authentication required
WWW-Authenticate: Mutual version=-draft05, algorithm=iso11770-4-dl-2048,
validation=host, auth-domain="www.example.com",
realm="Protected Contents", stale=0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Length: ...
In the second round-trip messages, the peers performs a password-based key-exchange.
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Authorization: Mutual version=-draft05, algorithm=iso11770-4-dl-2048,
validation=host, auth-domain="www.example.com",
user="foobar", wa="0EeAHWPU4Izqrag4vuMs036...VhGBTrdS0YUdlAE7+J2=="
HTTP/1.1 401 Authentication required
WWW-Authenticate: Mutual version=-draft05, sid=d9ea626480044abd,
wb="RUF+vO7/uSQ+/t+uzsV3mkL5/6...TE2w+9HyB6c88+Npptedy==",
nc-max=256, nc-window=64, time=300, path="/"
Content-Length: 0
The third, final exchange for the first request confirms whether the authentication has been
succeeded. Not only the server, but also the client confirms the mutual authentication using the
value ob returned from the server in the Authentication-Info header. The Authentication-
Control header specifies the browser should terminate the log-in session 300 seconds later.
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Authorization: Mutual version=-draft05, algorithm=iso11770-4-dl-2048,
validation=host, auth-domain="www.example.com",
user="foobar", sid=d9ea626480044abd, nc=0,
oa="33aVf+9Vgtdjh7S...S6NmleE/IFy="
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Authentication-Info: Mutual version=-draft05,
sid=d9ea626480044abd, ob="K6FkRV4gFy+XLh...Ow9gAAVhYkSg="
Authentication-Control: logout-timeout=300
Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Length: ...
Once a key-exchange has been succeeded, the shared key is reused for several HTTP requests
within the browsing session. The client uses the same session ID (sid) with an incremented nonce
count (nc) to request the authentication using the previously-shared secret. The Authentication-
Control header in the response reset a log-out timer set by the previous response to 300 seconds
again.
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GET /page2.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Authorization: Mutual version=-draft05,
algorithm=iso11770-4-dl-2048,
validation=host, auth-domain="www.example.com",
user="foobar", sid=d9ea626480044abd, nc=1,
oa="U6wm8+IlkhNmdM...33x0/wnLfz="
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Authentication-Info: Mutual version=-draft05,
sid=d9ea626480044abd, ob="0VV8C+KZsT6+...rN2vbKANiDoez="
Authentication-Control: logout-timeout=300
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: ...
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